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Analyzing Income Tax Evasion Using Amnesty 
Data with Self-Selection Correction: The Case 
of the Michigan Tax Amnesty Program 
Steven E. Crane and Farrolch Nourzad 
The issue of income tax evasion has been subjected to a great deal of scrutiny 
by economists. Since the pioneering work by Allingham and Sandmo ( 1972), 
the standard approach to analyzing the individual's evasion decision has been 
to employ a portfolio-choice framework in wh.icb the optimal level of evasion 
is obtained from maximizing lhe expected utility of incomt> after taxes and 
penalties. 
Using this approach. four factors have been commonly found to affect 
the decision to evade. These are lhe individual's true income. the tax rate, the 
probability that the evader wiU be detected, and the penalty rate to which 
detected evaders arc subjected. In most cases. a positive relationship between 
the level of evasion and the individual's true income. and negative relation-
ships with both of the compliance policy tools are obtained. With respect to 
the tax rate, however. most models have been unable to determine an unam-
biguous relationship due to potentially opposing income and substitution 
c1Tects. 1 
We wish 10 !hank JaniC' Alm. Cyrus Chu. Brian Erard. Susan Mantn, Marlhcw Murray. 
Joel Slemrod. Michael Udell, 11nd uurcolleagu~ ar Murquene Umvef!o.ty. We aho acknowledge 
linuncaal suppon from Mal'ljucne Umversiry College of Business Ad:mm,tmhon Miles Fund 
I. A tax rare mcn:a~c produce~ a ~ubslllullon effect lhar leads to greater evabion because 11 
increases rhe margrnal rerum to successful cvuqon On rhe mber hand. by reducing disposable 
mcome. a htgher rax rurc gencrarc.s an mcomc cflccr that may lead to more or lcs.~ eva.\ion 
d~pcnding on the indtliduol\ ntlltude tuwnrd mk. A~ long a~ ri~" uver..ion ts o decreasing 
luncllon of income, rhe incumc effect is negative Thl·refore. unlcs' rhk .wer,ton tncreases with 
tncome, or the su!),urullon eftecr i~ ~ttong enough to dummutc the mcomc effect. one obtai~ the 
counrenntuitive rc\ulr rhnr htgher 111' r:ues lead ro n::dur-cd eva,ion. or that the effect is indererm•-
nare A qualification llllht' wa' pointc!U out by Yi11halo ( 197-4). "ho hho1•cd tbm if taxes arc 
propomonal uod fine' are levied un evaded ra~c' rurher rhan evaded tnmmc. thcrc would be no 
wb~uruuon effect . 
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Considerable additional work hal> been done within this basic analytical 
framework. Perhaps most important have been attempts to endogenize various 
critical parameters, such as the penalty rate and the probability of detection 
(e.g., Koskela 1983). The model has also been made more complicated by 
introducLng an endogenous labor supply decision (e.g., Pencavel 1979; 
Sandmo J 981) and by adding richness to various aspects of the tax system. 
such as its degree of progressivity (e.g .. Marchon I 979: Pencavel 1979). The 
consequences of these extensions typically have been that few, if any, unam-
biguous predictions can be extracted from the model. 
Recently, a number of authors have approached the tax evasion question 
from a different perspective, using the tools of game theory (e.g., Graetz, 
Reinganum, and Wilde I 986: Reinganum and Wilde I 986 and I 988). In 
principle. this approach holds much promise, because it is perhaps the most 
effective way to truly endogenize the compliance policy variables in such a 
way as to adequately address the strategic aspects of the interaction between 
the taxpayer and the tax authority. However, it is a bit too soon to tell how 
successful this emerging literature will be in generating usable general conclu-
sions regarding the evasion decision. 2 
Empirically, a fairly extensive literature has emerged. Most of this em-
pirical work has its roots in the traditional portfolio-choice approach to model-
ing the decision to evade. What distinguishes these studies is how they cope 
with the obvious measurement difficulties associated with analyzing an illegal 
activity such as tax evasion. Indeed, a variety of innovative approaches to 
measuring evasion have been employed. 
Some researchers (e.g.. Friedland, Maital, and Rutenberg 1978; 
Geeroms and Wilmots 1985; Spicer and Becker I 980) have designed experi-
ments or conducted surveys in order to generate relevant data. Others (e.g., 
Crane and Nourzad 1986; Tanzi 1983) have approached the problem from a 
macroeconomic perspective. An attempt has even been made to develop an 
evasion index from the distribution of tax return!. within tax brackets (Siemrod 
1985). Only a few authors (e.g., Clotfelter 1983; Dubin and Wilde 1988; 
Klepper and Nagin 1989; Wille and Woodbury 1985) have been able to de-
velop direct measure!> that are representative of evasion behavior under actual 
tax systems. Of these, only Clotfelter has been able to examine the issue at the 
individual level. 
This essay presents an empirical investigation that is based on the tradi-
2 One inte~ting findmg lhu!- far is lhat a tax rate change generates an iltkhtional effect 
through i!S impact on the mru-ginal return to oucltting. It hal. been shown that. under some 
simplirying as~umption~ and for ccnain uudit cla~scs, thb cft'cct domu1otes the conventional tax 
rate cff« .. -ct leading to a negauve overall tmpact (sec Gracu:. Rcmganum. and Wilde 1986). This 
result holds tndependently of the taxpayer's 3UitUde toward ri~k . 
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tiona! theoretical framework but uses a new approach to measuring and ana-
lyzing income tax evasion. lt explains how data from state income tax am-
nesty programs can be used to construct direct measures of income tax 
evasion at the individual leveL We then demonstrate how these measures can 
be examined empiricaJJy, despite complications due to borh the self-selected 
nature of the data and the possible interaction between the decisions to evade 
at the federal and state levels. 
The rest of our essay is organized as follows. The next section makes the 
case for using amnesty data to analyze evasion and djscusses the methodologi-
cal procedures needed to address the complications that arise due to self-
selection bias and the presence of multiple taxing jurisdictions. The third 
section provides a brief overview of lhe income tax structure and the tax 
amnesty program in the state of Mich~gan, the source of the data used in this 
study. In the fourtb section we present our empirical model of Michigan state 
income tax evasion and our estimation results. Tbis is followed by some 
concluding comments in the fifth section. 
Using Amnesty Data to Study Evasion 
Amnesty Data as Evidence of Evasion 
State income tax amnesty programs represent what we believe is a new source 
of microdata that allows the construction of direct measures of tax evasion. 
Participants in these programs are effectively admjtting that they cheated and 
are indicating the magnitude of their noncompliance. Thus. the variable most 
difficult to quantify in an empirical evasion study, the level of noncompliance, 
is readily availab!e. This is especiaJly true if one focuses on amnesty filers 
who amended a return that was previously filed, rather than individuals who 
filed for the first time under amnesty.3 Assuming information from these 
amended filers' original returns is available, construction of an evasion mea-
sure is straightforward. One simply assumes that the amended returns repre-
sent the "truth" and compares the figures on these returns with their counter-
parts on the original returns.4 
In many cases, amnesty returns provide considerable information useful 
3. It is not clear what to do with the non filers , either theoretically or empirically. This is 
explained in n. 15, relating to our discussion of the data used here. 
4 . This seems to be a plausible assumption because it is unlikely that one who ha~ volun-
tarily admitted to evading on a panicular tax return would file a false amended rerum. This is 
cspeciaiJy true if it is announced that the amnesty returns may be audited as well. However. it 
may be argued that an individual might admit only a ponion of his or her evasion in the hope of 
reducing the chances of additional auditing. which could find the remaining evasion. 
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for constructing independent varjables as well. Given the assumption that the 
taxpayer is truthful when filing under amnesty, the information on the 
amended return will reveal such important taxpayer attributes as true income, 
and perhaps a usable marginal tax rate or certain demographic characteristics. 
What will most likely be lacking, however, are compliance policy vari-
ables. Because amnesty data are primarily cross-sectional and penalty provi-
sions are usually uniform across individuals, 5 no measure of the monetary 
cost of evasion is likely to be available. By the same token, reliable measures 
of either a subjective probability of detection or an objective audit rate proxy 
are not liketiy to be readily available at the state level. Thus, at best. some 
indirect control for detection probability is all that is likely to be possible. 
The Issue of Selectivity Bias 
A major drawback of using amnesty data for the purpose of analyzing evasion 
behavior is the probable self-selection bias due to the fact that amnesty filers 
themselves determined whether or not t11ey would participate in the program. 
Clearly, those evaders who voluntarily chose to participate in a particular 
state's amnesty program may not be representative of the population of in-
come tax evaders as a whole in that state. much less evaders in general. 
Fortunately, while complicated, it is possible to deal with this type of self-
selection bias econometrically. This involves using a maximum likelihood 
technique that incorporates not only the variables influencing the evasion 
decision, but also those influencing Lhe subsequent decision to participate in 
the amnesty program. 
The procedure can be described as follows. We wish to estimate an 
evasion function such as 
Y; = X1f3 + u1, i = I, 2, ... , n, (J) 
where y1 is a measure of evasion, X1 is a vector of the detemlinants of evasion, 
{3 is a vector of unknown parameters, and u1 is a random error tem1 with mean 
zero and variance u2. But because evaders who are also amnesty participants 
are a self-selected group. estimating equation I using ordinary least squares 
(OLS) would result in biased estimates. This is because the distribution from 
which the sample comes is truncated in that ir does not include nonparticipat-
ing evaders.6 
5. Usual! y many years are open for !lling. However, given bad memory and the expiration 
of the starute of limitations, one suspects most returns are for the most recent years. 
6. For a :survey of the literature on Lhe selectivity bias that arises from different types of 
self-selected samples along with remedial procedures, sec Madda!a 1983. chap. 9. Also see 
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Correcting the selectivity bias in amnesty data requires one to incorpo-
rate knowledge of factors that influenced the decision of amnesty-taking 
evaders to participate in the amnesty program. lf such factors can be identi-
fied, one can obtain unbiased maximum likelihood (ML) estimates of the 
parameters of equation I using the following likelihood function (Maddala 
1983' 266-67). 
(2) 
where Z, is a vector of factors influencing the participation decision. 8 is a 
vector of unknown parameters, <l? 0 is the distribution function of the stan-
dard normal, {is the correlation coefficient between u1 and the error term of 
the participation function, and all other notations are as defined previously.? 
The term in the large bracket is the ratio of the conditional probability of 
participation in the amnesty program, given (y1 - X1{3). to the unconditionaL 
probability of participation. The tenn outside of this bracket is the density 
function of (y1 - X;f3). Thus, the bias correction procedure involves scaling 
the density function of (Y; - X1{3) using the ratio of tJ1e two probabilities as 
weights. This procedure yields unbiased estimates for the parameters of the 
evasion model (the {3's), even iliough the estimates of ilie parameters of ilie 
participation function (the 8's) are unreliable. However, given that we are 
interested in the former set of estimates, the unreliability of the estimates of 5 
is no cause for concern. 
The Multiple Jurisdiction Issue 
An additional complication with the use of state amnesty data for analyzing 
evasion arises from an important institutional aspect of the overall income tax 
system in the United States. The income of most U.S. taxpayers is subject to 
Wainer (1986), especially the conlribution by Heckman and Robb (63- 107). To our knowledge, 
1he first application of selec1iviry corrcc1lon procedures 10 a taJ< compliance problem is by Pill and 
Slemrod ( 1989). 
7. lo choosing partictpation variables, one need not be concerned with possible correlation 
with 1he evasion variables. ln fact. some variables may appear in both the evasion and the 
participation functions . All 1llat is necessary for identification purposes is rhat the participation 
function com::uns more than just a constam term (sec Bloom and Killingsworth 1985). With this 
procedure, the critical factor is the correlation between the error tcnns of the evasion and the 
participation func1ions. 
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both federal and state income taxes. 8 ln this situation. there is likely to be 
overlap among the income tax returns that must be filed. Thus. we would 
expect that the decision regarding what to report on a state income tax return 
is likely to be affected by what was reported on a federal income tax return. 
and vice versa. 
This interconnection may be due to several factors, some of which can be 
u·aced to the strucrure of the srate return . Many state income taxes are pig-
gybacked on the federal tax system. A typical way of doing this is to use 
Federal Adjusted Gross Income (AGI), with selected modifications, as the 
income subject to state taxation. Some states taking this approach often re-
quire that copies of the federal return be submitted with the state return for 
verification purposes. In tltis context, an evader would most likely carry his or 
her understatement of federal AGl forward to the state income tax return . Tbis 
can result in state income tax evasion that is strictly caused by the federal 
evasion decision. 
The interconnection between federal and state income tax returns can be 
more subtJe, however. l n truth, it may be that the two returns are completed 
simultaneously as the individual weighs potential costs or benefits associated 
with compliance at the state level with the corresponding costs or benefits at 
the federal level. If there is a perceived ioterdependency between either the 
costs or benefits of the two systems, tlle amount of evasion on one tax rerum 
may be affected by and affect what is reported on the other return. Such a 
perceived interdependency could arise from the well-known fact that state and 
federal tax enforcement agencies have a variety of infonnation-sharing ar-
rangements. 
These possibilities suggest that an analysis of the behavior reflected on 
state tax returns should not be undertaken in isolation from the behavior 
reflected on the federal return. 9 Exactly how to deal with this, of course, 
depends on the details of the tax code of the particular st~tc whose amnesty 
data are employed. 
Michigan Income Tax System and Amnesty Program 
The Michigan Income Tax 
Michigan's income tax system is fairly straightforward and closely linked to 
the federal system. ln fact, the Michigan system is piggybacked on Lhe federal 
. 
8. The taxpayer may also be ~ubjcctto local income taxes a~ well However, these taxes are 
genernlly leJ.~ relevant in lhc pre~nt context because lhcy are u~uruly \Imply payroll taxes where 
the full amount 1~ withheld As u result, there 1\ not much 10 lhc mcome reporting ll>,UC, and there 
may not even be a tax return to lite. 
9. The interdependency 1\ at ..a relevant to lhe analysts of fedcr.U tax eva\ JOn. although the 
dfcct maybe \\Cakerifth.edJrccuonofcau~ahtyt~pnmariJyfrom the federJI return tolhcstatc return. 
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return such that Michigan residents begin completing their state return by 
reporting the AGl figure found on their federal returns. Several adjustments to 
federal AGI are then made to allow for both income that is taxable at the state 
but not at the federal level and for income that is not taxable in the state of 
Michigan but is taxable at the federal level. to Making these .adjuslments 
results in the income subject to tax , from which personal exemptions ($1 ,500 
each). but not itemized deductions. are subtracted to obtain state taxable 
income. 
Michigan Taxable Lncomc was subject to a flat tax rate that varied from 
4.60 percent to 6.35 percent during the different tax year:. covered by this 
study ( 1980-85). Two different sets of credits were then deducted from the 
resulting gross tax figure. 11 Once these credi ts were removed, any tax pay-
ments through withholding or quarterly estimated payments were deducted to 
determine U)e balance due or amoum of refund. 
Given this tax structure . evasion could occur on a return in a number of 
ways. First., the Jevel of AGJ may have been misstated. However, given that 
this fi gure was to be taken from the federal return, it seems like ly that any 
evasion here was driven by decisions made when filling out the federal re-
turn. 12 Second, the additions to or subtractions from AGI could be misstated. 
As with AGI. most of this information appears on the federal tax return and its 
associated schedules. However, since copies of the supplemental federal 
schedules were not required by the state authorities. it is possible that some 
independent. state-driven evasion may have occurred at this point. 
The other primary possibilities for evading on Michigan income rax 
returns include overstating the number of exemptions or either type of credit. 
Of course, one could also have overstated withholding or estimated payment 
levels, but, given the clear paper trail associated with these items, this seems 
less likely. Thus, the type of evasion at the state level that seems most likely to 
10. The primary adJUStments that are added 10 AGJ are interest mcome n:cetved from olber 
states. certain c.apital gains and other gams. and losses anributablc to acltvuy in other Mates. The 
pnmary subtractions from AGI an: for mtercst income from the federal government. military pay 
or benefits, retirement or pension benefit~. certain capital g:uru, and income attributable to 
another state. 
II . The first set of credit~ were for mcome taxes paid to Michtgan ctltcs or other states and 
cuntributionR to Michigan institution~ such as universities and libraries. The second set of credi ts 
were spcctal allowances for such items as property taX payments. home heating expenditures. and 
investment& in solar energy equipment 
12. The original decision to evade on the federal return could be infiucnced by oppor-
tunities on the .:.tate rerum We do not consider this possible feedbacl.. Of course, ;u:st because this 
type of cv:c.ion is federally driven docs not mean that it is not smte eva~ton . In fact. 11 may be that 
some smte evasion occurs because the individual wants hiS or her ~tate return co be con~istent with 
hts or her federal return Th~ doe!. ~U8£C'>I, however. that one muM lool.. cl!>ewhcre for explana-
tion\ or thb fonn of >tate evasion behav1or 
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have occurred is a misstatement of adjustments to AGI. an overstatement of 
credits from the gross tax biJJ, or some combination of the two. What makes 
this activity potemially observable is the existence of a tax amnesty pro-
gram. 
The Michigan Tax Amnesty Program 
The Mkhigan Tax Amnesty Program was fairly convemionaJ.I3 Since it is 
described in detail elsewhere (see Bowman and Martin 1987 and 1988b; 
Fisher, Goddeeris, and Young 1989), only a brief summary will be provided 
here. Michigan Amnesty ran for a limited time. from May 12 through June 
30, 1986. Under this program, which was part of a comprehensive overhaul 
of the state's tax enforcement system, individuals were invited to come for-
ward and report tax deficiencies for any state tax. 1 ~ The carrot used to encour-
age amnesty filings was that all criminal and civil penalties were waived. The 
stick was that penalties were to be raised significantly after amnesty expired. 
and there was to be a dramatic increase in the enforcement effort. IS 
Amnesty was viewed as an unqualified success by the Michigan au-
thorities, as almost $110 million was coJJected. representing a payback of 
$55 for every $1 expended on the program. It was recognized that these 
figures overstated the effectiveness of the program. however, because they 
included collections of receivables from those who were already known to the 
tax authorities and from those who would have been identified using normal 
procedures. As with many other states, Micnigan both pennitted and encour-
aged those with known, but currently outstanding, deficiencies to participate. 
Nevertheless, the Michigan Department of Treasury estimates Lhat about 
37 pcrcenl of the returns and 41 percent of the revenue can1e from "original 
cases" that were not in receivables or otherwise previously known to the 
department. 
Because our essay focuses on income tax evasion, only those who filed 
for income tax amnesty are of currem interest. After eliminating the returns 
based on known receivables, there were 32,614 returns claiming amnesty for 
income tax deficiencies. which represented 69 percent of the returns filed. and 
13. For a comparauvc ~urvey of the general provisions of vanou~ stales' nmncscy pro-
grams, see Mikesell (1986). Summary material also can be found ln Dubin, Graetz. and Wilde 
(1990). 
14. The taxes included were income, sales/use. single business. intangible~. inheritance, 
excise. severance, and public utility propeny tax. However, almost four-fifths of lhe revenue 
collected came from the individual income, single business. and use lax. 
15. For details on the increased compliance effon at the state level, see Bowman and 
Martin ( 1988a). li should also be pointed out that all amncscy infomllltion wns forwarded to the 
IRS. 
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3 1 percent of the nonrecei vable amnesty revenue. This made income tax filers 
one of the largest groups of amnesty participants. 
To file for income tax amnesty, individuals used the state 's standard 
amended individual income tax form. This form closely follows the Michigan 
individual income tax return itself. In fact, it requests figures as originaUy 
reported on any previously filed return, the change!) in any of those figures . 
and the new, "correct" figure. This makes it quite simple to measure non-
comp)jance. We simply compared the newly reported figures with lhe origi-
nally reponed figures. 
We have claimed that Michigan 's Tax Amnesty Program was conven-
tional in most respects. However. there is one very notable difference from 
most other states, which bas to do with Lhc attention given 10 advance plan-
ning for subsequent research . The Michigan Department of Treasury was 
more interested in extensively investigating amnesty participants than most 
other state treasury departments. Toward this end , they created the Mkhigan 
Amnesty Data Base. which represents a I 0 percent random sample of all 
amnesty parucipants . This involved expending over 1,250 hours of labor 
accumulating, entering, and verifying information submitted by participants. 
The original one-in-ten sampling included accounts receivable returns, 
but these were subsequently discarded , as were a number of returns contain-
ing problems that made them unusable. The Amnesty Data Base contained 
4.203 nonreceivable returns overall. of which 2,985 or 71 percent pertained to 
income taxes. Of these, 588 were filed by individuals who were amending a 
return filed previously, while 2,397 were individuals who had not filed pre-
viously. The Michigan Department of Treasury believes that lhis sample is 
representative (>f the population of Michigan State Tax Amnesty filers, while 
at the same time recognizing that it is not li kely to be representative of the 
popuJation of Michigan income tax evaders as a whole. It is this latter prob-
lem we hope to neutralize through the self-selection bias correction procedure 
described previously. 
The Empirical Model and Est imation Results 
Specifying an Empirical Model of State Evasion 
[n our empirical analysis. we are concerned only with income rax amnesty 
filers. Further, we limit our attention to those who had previously filed and 
were, therefore, filing amended returns under amnesty. 16 This means that the 
16. There are two relll>OOS for limiting auenlion to the amended rerum filers. One is. 
tltcoretical. Non filer.. are examples of comer solution individuals who are nonnnlly cxpliculy 
ruled out prior to conducting the compnmtivc stmic analysb that provides the foundation for any 
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largest possible sample for our analysis would contain 588 observations. 
However. the sample actually used in this study is considerably smaller. 
Prior to carrying out our econometric analysis, we examined the data for 
internal consistency. This involved recalculating the tax bill and reconciling 
this with the net balance due on both the original and amended returns of each 
of these 588 individuals. In the process. we discovered a number of problem 
observations. For some observations, all or most of the data were missing 
from one or both returns. ln other cases, obvious taxpayer or data entry errors 
were found. In still others. we were simply unable to replicate the figures on 
the tax returns by making the required calculations. Ln a few cases. the figures 
suggested negative evasion of one form or another. 
After removing the observations with these problems, the sample size 
was reduced to 213 observations. While this loss of observations is regret-
table, we believe that by trimming the sample we are reducing the measure-
ment error and thus may be increasing the signal-to-noise ratio in the data. We 
are unaware of any systematic bias that these omissions might have introduced 
into the sample, allhough we recognize that a large sample size would be 
preferable given our use of the maximum likelihood estimation procedure. 
In analyzing the data in this sample, we must address the two issues 
raised previously, namely. the self-selection bias inherent in the amnesty data 
and the interdependency between the federal and state tax returns. Regarding 
the latter, as a first approximation, we assume the process is recursive in that 
the decision to evade state income taxes follows the decision to evade federal 
income taxes. 
The individual is assumed to decide how much federal income tax he or 
she wishes to evade, and then to complete a federal tax rerum accordingly. 
Then he or she completes a state tax return conditional on what has been 
reported at the federal level. Thus, we allow for unidirectional causality from 
the federal evasion decision to the state tax evasion decision, while neglecting 
the possibility of full simultaneity between the two. Ln light of both the 
relative magnitudes of the two tax bills and the way people typically fill out 
their returns, t11is is not unreasonable. ln any case, this is an improvement 
over simply ignoring any interdependency on the grounds that we have little 
or no theoretical guidance as to what to expect. 17 
sign expectations. The other reason is tied to measurement and econometrics. One measure of 
evasion is the amount of income not reponed. which in this case is exactly equal to true income. 
Thus, one might be in the position of wanting to regress income on income. If the mc.asure of 
evasion is evaded taxes, then one could be regressing this on income and taxes , which is, of 
course, how evaded taxes was calculated. 
17. See. for example, Crane and Nourzad ( 1990). 
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Viewing the problem in this way affects how state income tax evasion is 
measured. Because the Michigan income tax system is so closely tied to the 
federal system, a significant portion of the evasion that appeaTh on the state 
return may simply be a carry-through from the federal evasion decisiOn. Ln 
other words. a misstatement of federal AGI may be carried forward to the 
state return for consistency and result in a reduced state tax Liability. However, 
this incidental state level evasion is the result of the federal tax evasion 
decision and not the decision to evade state income taxes per se and should be 
netted out. 18 
Jn order to net out the federally driven state evasion we assume that t.he 
AGI figure reported on the state return accurately represents what was filed at 
the federal level. If tbis is true. any difference between the amended AGI 
figure and the AGI figure originally reponed must be due to evasion traceable 
to the federal tax rerum. This difference is then subtracted from the difference 
between the taxable income reponed on U1e amended and original state in-
come tax returns. The result is a measure of the misstatement of the additions 
and subtractions ro federal AGI when adjusting it for Michigan tax purposes. 
This is an income-based measure that is, arguably, purely Michigan-based 
evasion. 
Given the extensive tax credit system that is part of the Michigan tax 
code. we must also take possible crcdjt overstatement into account. Once 
again. this is determined by comparing the originally reported figures with 
Ulose on the amended return. To get a measure of overall evru.ion, we multiply 
Ule misstatement of income by the appropriate tax rate and add the result to 
the misstated credit figure. This gives an overaJI measure of Michigan income 
tax evasion not rureclly canied forward from the federal tax retum.l9 
This evasion measure is to be regressed on a series of independent 
variables chosen by drawing on Ule tra<.litional theoretical evasion models, the 
results of previously empirical work on evasion, and data availability. In 
principle. we should control for true income, marginal tax rate, probability of 
detection. and penalty rate. Unfortunately, data availability and institutional 
considerations limit our options. 
To reflect the individual's true income level, we use AGI as reported on 
the amended return. While a broader measure of income would be preferable, 
none is available to us. The fact that Michigan is a flat rate tax state means 
18 In fact. if this is nol done. it wuutd amount to building in a sp~tnou~ pu~itivc relatton-
shtp belwccn Michigan cvru.ion und true income, one of our independ(llll variables This will 
become evident as 1he emptrical model is developed 
19. The measun: or credil miJt~latcmcnt •~ the difference be1wcen total credet~ clwmed on 
lhe amended and the origtnal relum\ 
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that, in any given year, the same tax rate applies to all mdividuals. Therefore, 
no marginal tax rate variable can be included in our essentially cross-sectional 
econometric model of '> tate tax evasion. 
The problems adentified in the previous section with the compliance 
policy variable~ were encountered as expected. The fact that the sample is 
primarily cross-sectional , coupled with the unifonnity of Michigan's penalty 
rate across individuals during our sample period, mean:, that no penalty rate 
can be included in the model. In principle, a similar problem should not be 
present for the probability of detection; subjective as~essments of detection 
probability certainly vary across individuals. Therefore, it as at least concep-
rually possible to have a different probability for each individual. 
In practice. however. reliable measures of subjective probabilities are 
difficult to obtain. A common alternative in empirical evasion studies has 
been to use some measure of the objective audit probability as a proxy. 
Unfortunately, detailed audit figures are very sensitive information from the 
perspective of the tax authorities and nre often not available. 
Because or the difficulty with obtaining direct measures of audit ac-
tivities, we have resorted to controlling for differenual probability of detection 
effects in an andirect manner. Michigan Treasul) documents indacate that. 
prior to the reorganazation that followed amnesty, compliance efforts were 
divided among Treasury offices in nine geographic regions. Since each office 
had considerable discretion over enforcement efforts in its area, it seems 
plausible that Michigan audit rates vaned by these geographic regions. There-
fore, using zip codes, we associate each amnesty filer wnh one of these nine 
geographic regiom. and construct a o;cries of dummy variables that reflect 
these regions. 
In addition to !he variables idcnti fied by theory, previous empirical evi-
dence suggests that we should also control for demographic characteristics 
and differences in opportunities for underreporting certam types of income. In 
this vein, we include dummy variables to reflect married filers and male 
filers. lO We also include a dummy variable indicating returns Lhat were pre-
pared by professional tax pre parers. 21 Further, in order to reflect diiTcrcnces in 
the opportunity to underreport. we include a variable measuring the percent-
age of the overall tax bill that wru. withheld. 
We complete our basic state evasion equation by including one addational 
20 The Iauer. of cuur.c. only apphe~ to :!>ingle file~. becau\c mamed filcn. mu~• include 
an mdtvtduul of each ..c' . 
21 The e'pected \ign on the profe<>-'>tunal til\ preparer variable t\ conrroveNal. In foct. m 
1987, the IRS held a confcn:nce regarding the role of the tax pr.KIItioncr in promuung l1IX 
comphunc:c at "htch the topn: wa:. debated at great length Comphcaung the matter funher 1~ the 
fact thut tht~ variable may be: ond•1genou' 
Using Amnesty Data with Self-Selection Correction 179 
variable to control for evasion behavior at the federal level. Given our conten-
tion that there may be a link between the federal and the state evasion deci-
sions. we believe that some measure of federal evasion must be a part of an 
analysis of evasion on the state tax return. Ideally, we would use a measure of 
ll1e full amount of evasion found on the federal tax return. Of course, doing 
this would require access to the federal tax returns of the individuals in our 
sample, which, unfortunately, was not available to us. As an alternative. for 
our measure of evasion oo the federaJ return, we use the difference between 
the AGI reported on the amnesty rerum and that on the original state rerum.22 
We incorporate federal evasion into our model using a two-step pro-
cedure, where federal evasion is first regressed on a series of its determinants, 
and the predicted value is then included in the stat~ evasion ~quation. Because 
our measure of federal evasion contains a disproportionate number of zero 
values (44 out of 213 observations). the tobit estimation procedure is em-
ployed.23 
lt is difficult to form an a priori sign expectation for the coefticient of this 
variable. The effect will likely depend on whether cheating at the state level is 
perceived by the evader as a substitute for cheating at the federal level or as a 
complement to it. In the latter case, one would expect a positive sign for this 
coefficient. wbile one would expect a negative sign in the former case. 
As with the state evasion model. selection of explanatory variables used 
in the federal evasion equation is based on a combination of ll1eoretical 
guidance, past empirical results, and data availability. Two primary variables 
are true income and the marginal tax rate. To capture the effect of true income, 
we include measures of AGI and AGI-squared based on the amended return. 
The quadratic term is included to allow for possible nonHoearities due to both 
risk aversion and the progressivity of the federal tax system. To capture the 
direct federal tax rate effect. we include the marginal tax rate that applied to 
the average taxable income of each individual's AGI class. 24 
Reasonable federal tax compliance variables were more difficult to ob-
tain. In fact, we could come up with no penalty rate variable that was Michi-
gan specific, yet had the necessary variance across individuals. The same held 
22. Obviou~ly th1s w1ll not r..:nect ull federal evllSion, because 11 misse~ any federal evasion 
taking the form of ovcr&Uitcd exemptions. deductions. or credits However. it is the only measure 
currently available. In addition, if for some reason there are discrepanc1es between the AGI on the 
federal return and the state rerum, our eva..~ion variable w11J be meru.ured with error. 
23. In principle. a self-selection corrcctiOII ~hould be applied 31 this s1agc lC> well. To date. 
we have not been able to obtain estimates usmg thiS more comphcated procedure. 
24. Specifically. we determined the federal AGI class thai each tndividual belonged 10 
using rhe LRS Stnristics ()f lncome- Jndividual!Rctums. Next, we calculared the average tnxable 
mcomc for those fall in~ in this pmiculnr AGI class. Finally. the marginal tax rnte on this average 
laJtablc lncomc was detenninec.l by t:onsulring the ijppropriatc tax Ulble. 
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lrue for a direct measure of the audit rate. However, we do incorporate 
indirect audit controls by making use of the fact that the IRS categorizes 
taxpayers into different audit classes based upon rerum characteristics and 
subjects these classes to different audit regimes. Based on this, we include 
dummy variables that loosely categorize our sample individuals into feder-ctl 
audit classes.25 While it is not clear exactly what we should expect of these 
variables in terms of sign and significance, it is hoped that their inclusion will 
be a sufficient control for the differential audjt probabilities. 
Since the federal evasion uecision is also likely to be affected by the 
opponunities available. we need an additional control for this influence. How-
ever. given that we do not have access to the federal returns. no mforn1ation 
on federal tax withholding is available. As an alternative, we construct a 
dummy variable identif) ing returns of mdividuals belonging to occupations 
that tend to have greater opportunitie~ to evade. These include returns of the 
self-employed, farmers. and salespeople. Finally, we include the two 
dummies for demographic characteristics discussed earlier- male and mar-
ried, as weiJ as the dummy reflecting the use of a paid tax preparcr. The logic 
follows that of our earlier discussion. 
As djscussed previously, our Michigan evasion model cannot be esti-
mated usjng OLS because the sample is self-selected . In order to apply the 
maximum likelihood estimation procedure discussed previously. we need to 
incorporate the participation decision into the likelihood function . This re-
quires identifying factors influencing this decision. There is little formal work 
to draw on regarding the determinants of amnesty panicipation. However. 
recent work using this same Michigan Amnesty Data File by Fisher, God-
deeris, and Young ( 1989) is helpful. 26 They argue that the dcc1sion to partici-
pate in amnesty programs is influenced by the perceived increase in the 
postamnesty penalty and the probability of detection and, to some extent, by 
nonpecuniary factors such as personal guilt. 
As with our evasion equation, there is Unle we can do with the postam-
nesty penalty rate because penalties are generally uniform . Therefore, we 
concentrate on the other factors . The perceived increase in the probability of 
detection IS likely to depend upon what one think!. or expects about the 
25 The audit cbaroclcn~tic~ and cln~:.es ore as follows. CLASS3: return' with AGI below 
$10.000, wuh funn or ~elf-cmpluymem income: CLASS4: return~ wuh AGI bclwccn $10.000 
and $50.tl00. without fann or ~clf·cmpluymcnt income: CLASS5: ro1urn' with AGI between 
'!> 10,000 and $30.000. wnh f:mn or ~lf·employmenl income; CLASS6: returns wilh AGI gre~uer 
than $50.000. but nu farn1 or ~elt~mployrnem mcome: and CLASS?· rolurn\ wilh AGI greater 
than $30.000, with fann or sclf-cmpluymcnl mcome. In our model. the d~:faull cutcgory t.'> returns 
wilh AGI Jc.~ thun S 10.000 and no fann or ~elf cmploymem income. 
26 For additional work on arnnc!.ty partrcrpalion. see Andreom 119881. u'<•nard and 
7..eckhnu;,cr ( 19871: Malik and Schwab ( 1988). 
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postamnesty compliance effort. We attempt to capture this inftuence in several 
ways. 
It is widely known that certain types of income such as rents, royalties, 
and business income are typically undcrreported wilh greater frequency Lhan 
other income. Thus. we might reasonably expect the tax authorities to concen-
rrate their enforcement efforts in these areas. In this case, rerums with these 
types of income will likely receive increased postamncsty scrutiny, and Lhe 
evaders who fi led returns conraining these items might reasonably expect their 
probability of detection to rise.27 Basetl on this reasoning, we construct a 
dummy variable to identify returns with income from these sources. 
Another way to partially capture the effectS of a perceived increase in the 
postamnesry compliance effort is suggested by Michigan Department of Trea-
sury documents. These indicate that special attention was to be focused on the 
returns of professionals who were licensed by the state. Therefore. we define 
another dummy variable that identifies returns of individuals in occupations 
that are typically licensed by states. 2tl 
We also make a crude effort at allowing for possible nonpecuniary influ-
ences using an interesting piece of information contained in the Amnesty Data 
File. The Data Base identifies all returns in the sample that were accompanied 
by a special letter of explanation concerning amnesty. Including l.uch a Jetter 
is cunou~ behavior given that the idea of amnesty is to induce people to come 
forward in part because there will be no questions asked. lt seems somewhat 
plausible that those feeling the need to provide a special explanation for their 
panicipation are individuals who may be experiencing some type of remorse 
over their behavior. W1th this in mind, we specify a dummy variable reflecting 
the presence of such a feller. 
On the other hand, the factor that perhaps has the greatest effect on the 
perceived increase in postamnesty detection probability reflects an influence 
that IS not directly related to the Michigan amnesty program. It is quite likely 
that the perceived probability of detection at the state level would rise !>ignifi-
cantly following an IRS audit. Therefore, sucb individuals would probably be 
much more likely to participate in a state amnesty program. To control for this 
effect, we use information in the Amncs1y Data Base to construct a dummy 
variable indicating that t.he participant was under IRS audit. 
To summarize. the participation decision is incorporated into the likeli-
27. Thi~ i~ 1rue regardlc~\ of !he foml 1hc uc1ual ev3.Sion t<')OI.. Nmc a~ well thUlthc f:tcl that 
the prcamnc-.ly probabiht)' of l;lcing :IUdilCd mtghl have depended 00 lhc presence \If lhCSC IWO 
I)'~ of income does nol undtnmne our hnc ot rea~omng What \OiC an: arguing i' that their 
presence in unc·-. origmal n:1um h~ an addnaonal po~1:1mne~1y cffe<:t 
21! The categoric!> ~.~>c sdcntify with tlus vanabh: are archneclUn:. medtctnc/henhh. taw. 
pen.onal 'crvtce~. and tmn~pon:ttton 
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hood function using dummy variables representing ( I) sources of income that 
are likely to attract attention, (2) occupational categories that had been tar-
geted for additional scrutiny, (3) unusual behavior that may reflect remorse at 
having evaded. and (4) the fact that a return was under review by the rRS. 
Obviously, this specification is rather ad hoc and too simple to completely 
capture the complex participation decision. However, given the data limita-
tions, we believe this is a reasonable fi rst auempt that we hope cal!l adequately 
neutralize the bias in our sample. 
TABLE 1. Tobit Estimates of Unreported Federal Adjusted Gross Income 
on Original Returns of Michigan Income Tax Amnesty Participants (FEDEVA) 
Normalized Asymptotic 
Variable• Coefficiem T-Ratio p-Valucb 
AGI 0.89769£ -05 3.09 16 0.00 185 
AGTSQ - 0 .37268E-06 -3. 1909 0.00 130 
MTR 0.307 11 E-0 1 2.378 1 0.01660 
OCCUPTN 0.49835 1.95 17 0 .05048 
PREPARE 0.762 15 4.2921 0.00002 
MALE 0.44382E-01 0. 16595 0 .86820 
MARRiED 0.883 19E-01 0.46735 0.64037 
CLASS3 - 0.28912 -0.349 19 0.72693 
CLASS4 - 0 .31495 -0.80268 0.42179 
CLASS5 - 0 .89862 - 1.0774 0.28070 
CLASS6 - 1.2412 -2.2636 0.02339 
CLASS? 0 .35 106 0.46854 0.63915 
Con~tant - 1. 1791 - 2 7107 0 00673 
Squared correlation between 
observed and predicted values 0.2270 
Log likelihood - 1815.0489 
• Variable dcfiniliuiTh are as rollnws . 
AG I = Adj~tcd gro~ income on amended return 
AGJSQ "' AGI squared 
FEDEVA = Underreponed federal 1\01 
MTR = F.:dcru1 margmal Wt rotc 
OCCVPTN = I of occup:umn "' sulos. self-employed, or ra.mung; otherwise = 0 
MALE "' I lor mttle Wtpnyers: otherwise = 0 
MARRIED = I fnr mamed tl))(paycrs; Olherwbe = 0 
PREPARE = I of rerum prepared by u professoonal prcpar.:-r; otherwose = 0 
CLASS3 c I if AG I s SIO.U<Xl with frum or self-employment mcome, Olherwtse ~ 0 
CLAS$4 = I of SIO.OOO s AOI s $50.000 without fann or self-(:mploymenL irn:ome, otherwise 0 
CLASSS = I of S 10.000 s 1\GI s $30.000 with farm or self-employmc:nt oncqmc; otherwose ~ 0 
CLASS6 = J if AGI 2: $50,000 without fnnn or ,;;,If-employment income: otherwise = 0 
CLASS7 = l if AGI 2: $30.000 with f3nn or -.elf-employment lncomt:; otherwise = 0 
bM urgmul socmticnnce level. prob lrl < ·•· 
Using Amnesty Data with Self-Selection Correction I 83 
The Estimation Results 
We begin our review of the estimation results with the tobit estimates for the 
first stage, which explain the magnitude of the understatement of federal AGJ 
(results shown in table l ). All things considered, reasonable results are ob-
tained. Both AGI and AGI squared are statistically significant. and have a 
positive-negative sign pattern. which suggests that. other things being equal, 
evasion rises with increases in true AGI. but at a decreasing rate. 
The federal tax rate (MTR) has a statistically significant positive effect 
on evasion. This is consistent in tenns ot: sign and significance with some 
previous findings (e.g .. Clotfelter 1983; Crane and Nourzad 1986). The co-
efficient of the occupation dummy variable (OCCUPTN) is also positive and 
statistically significant. This is as expected. given the widely held view that 
individuals in these occupations have greater opportunities to evade. Jo con-
trast, neither of the demographic variables appears to have any relevance for 
explaining the level of unreported federal AGl. 
The remaining parameter estimates are more difficult to interpret. The 
significant positive coefficient for the professional tax preparer dummy 
(PREPARE) could spark some controversy. However, given such complica-
tions as the blurred distinction between tax evasion and avoidance and the 
ability of the taxpayer to shop around for a sympathetic preparer, it is difficult 
to know what to make of this finding. Along these same lines. a reasonable 
interpretation for the audit class coefficients is not readily apparent. Thus, we 
make no attempt to draw compliance policy inferences from these estimated 
coefficients and remain content to treat them as nothing more than necessary 
control variables. 
Of course, the results shown in table l. however interesting, are a means 
to an end rather than an end in themselves. This equation has been estimated 
primarily to obtain the predicted values of FED EVA that are then fed into the 
Michigan evasion estimation that is the main focus of our analysis. The 
maximum likelihood estimates for Michigan, which allow for the effect of the 
federal evasion decision and correct for self-selection bias, are reported in 
table 2.29 
Tbe predicted value of FEDEVA has a significant positive effect on pure 
Michigan income tax evasion. This would suggest that state-level evasion is 
complementary to federal evasion. even when the carry-through effect is 
29. Prior 10 esrimarion. all continuous variable~ enrcring the likelihood function were 
Mandardized using the sample meuns and srnndard devialion~ . Thi~ wa~ done 10 improve the 
convergence properties of rhe model. OLS re_,ul!s using the same smndardizcd variables arc 
reported i:n appendix table A I for comparison purpose~ 
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TABLE 2. Maximum likelihood Estimates (with Self-Selection Correction) of 
Michigan lndividuam Income Taxes Evaded IMICHEVAl 
Variable• Coefficient T-Ratio 
FED EVA 0.284086 3.677 
AGI 0.4 10593 2.478 
PCfWHD -0. 159595 -2. 165 
MALE - 0.410599 -1.242 
MARRIED - 0. 117273 -0.633 
PREPARE - 0.482466 -2 .526 
MTCLEMENS - 0.0 1675 1 -0.091 
FLINT - 0.338720 -0.616 
SAGINAW 0.056257 0.13 1 
LANSING - 0.125622 -0.320 
KALAMAZOO - 0 .124401 - 0.216 
GRANDRAPI 0.30 1049 1.250 
TRAVERSE 0.268905 1. 170 
UP - 0.099677 - 0 333 
Constant I 0.954183 2.707 
lRS-AUDrr 0.32 1658 0.8 15 
LICENSED 7.609160 0.000 
GUILT -0. 188707 -0.513 
RENTROYL - 0.338990 -0.487 
Constanl2 - 0. 172743 -0.252 
~ 0.8592 15 6.734 
Squared cmre1ation between 
observed and predicted values 0.4356 
Log likelihood -233.7700 
•Vari able definitions are as follow~. 
FEDEVA ; Pred1cted value of I'EDEVA (from cable I) 
MICHEVA ; Michigan income caxcs evaded 
PCTWHD = Pcrccnlag~ of Michigan income ta~ withheld 
MTCLEMENS ~ I if csxpnycr's 1.ip code in Mounc Clemens area; ocherwose = () 
FLINT "' I if taxpayer's tip code in !'line area: oth~rwise = 0 
SAGINAW = I If taxpayer'~ t.ip code in Sngina"' area: uchcrwi..e = () 
LANSING = I of caxpay~r·s ZIP code in L:ln~ing nrca; olhcrwi.e = 0 
KALAMAZOO -= I if taxpayer's :tip code in Kalnm:uoo orca. otherwise = 0 
GRANORAPI = I if caxpaycr'• Lip ~ode in Gntnd Rapid.\ area; olho:rwi-;c = 0 
TRAVERSE -= 1 1f ta><paycr's ztp code on Traverse Clly, area; otherwl,;c = 0 
ll1' = I if wpayer"s zip code 111 Upper Pcnoo,ulo, uchcrwi~ = 0 
IRS-AUDIT = I 1f caxpayer under IRS nudit; och~rwi$c = 0 
p-Value 
0.00024 
0.01320 
0.0304 1 
0.21437 
0.52676 
0.011 54 
0.92772 
0.53769 
0.89605 
0.74905 
0.82882 
0.2 11 38 
0.24216 
0.73942 
O.Cl0678 
0.4 1486 
0.99988 
0.60762 
0.62603 
0.80 118 
0.00000 
LICENSED = I tf taxpayer's occupation = nrchicecture . rncd1cine. health. lnw. personal scrv1ccs. 
cransponation, otherwi,;e = 0 
RENTROYL = 1 if rents. royalties. or t>u~in~• mcome pre..'i<!nt: uchcrwi>c = 0 
GUfLT = 1 tf a Jeuer of cxplanacion accompamed amended returns: otherwise ~ 0 
All other variabl~ are defined in table I, 
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eliminated. ln other word:., on average. pure state-level evasion incrcaJ.es as 
federal evasion rises. This al~>o suggest~> that a careful matching of federal and 
state tax return data may be an effective compliance policy tactic. A !>imilar 
conclusion might be drawn regarding back-up withholding provisions, given 
the significant negative relationship between state-level evasion and the pro-
ponion of the ta>. b11l withheld (PCfWHD). 
According 10 the data in table 2, true income (AGI) has a significant 
positive effect on evasion. as one would expect. On the other hand, the 
demographic variables perform poorly in the Michigan ev~10n equation. as 
neither coefficient achieves statistical significance at conventional levels. As 
for the geographic region dummy variables, none is individually statistically 
significant. However. it is hoped that, together. they control for differences in 
audit rates. 
Jn contrast. the professional tax preparer variable (PREPARE) produces 
an interesting result: its coeffic1ent is statisticaJly ~ignificam but h~ the op-
posite sign a~> in table I. In other words. it appears that, on average. the use of 
a professional tax preparer is associated with more evasion at the federal level, 
but less evasion at the state level. This ts a bit difficult to explam. One 
possibility is that tax preparers recognile a close hnk between the funding of 
slate government and both the1r own welfare and that of their clients. Of 
course. it could also be an indication of shortcomings in model specification 
or variable measurement. This 1:. ceraamly a topic for further investigation. 
ln addition to the evasion function coefficient~. the maximum likelihood 
procedure also provide!. estimates for the participation parameters (a..., shown 
in table 2) But little should be made of these estimates thcmselve.<;;. RecaJI 
that the participatiOn variables are included to correct for selection bias. and 
reliable eMimates of the corresponding coefficients are not to be expected 
(Maddala 1983, 267). ll is worth noting, however. that t, the corrclnrion 
coefficient between the error tcnns of the evasion and panicipation functions. 
is quite large and is statistically significant, as would be expected given the 
self-selected nature of a sample of tax amnesty participants. 
Concluding Comments 
We have employed a new approach to measuring and empirically analyzing 
income tax evasion. Using data from the Michigan State lncome Tax Amnesty 
Program, we demonstrated how state amnesty data can be utiliLed to construct 
a direct measure of evasion at the individual level. Proper empiricaJ analysis 
of the evasion behavior embodied in th1s measure required u::. 10 address two 
problems. First, because the data pertained only to voluntary participant::. in 
the state amnesty program, we had to employ self-selection bias correction 
procedures that take the amnesty participation dec1sion into account. Second, 
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because these data arc related to a state that closely links its income tax code 
ro the federal tax system, we had to examine evasion at both levels 10 order to 
take the possible imerjurisdictional mlluences into account. 
Our analysis mdicates that there 1!1 a positive linkage from evasion mlhe 
federal level to evaston at the swte level. In addition. we find that higher 
income and greater noncompliance opportunity lead to greater evasion at both 
levels. We also find ~orne support for the proposition that federal marginal tax 
ratel> arc positively related to federal evasion. Another result. which IS some-
what curious, is that the use of a professional ta>. preparer is associated with 
more evasion at the federal level. but less evasion at the state level. On the 
other hand, our result!> provide no insights into the effects on evasion of either 
deterrence efforts or demographic characteristics. 
The research described here should be of interest for several reasons. 
Some of the results provide additional evidence regarding the effects of such 
traditional theoretical determinants of evasion as income and the marginal tax 
rate. Others confirm the importance of such institutional arrangements as tax 
withholding as effective compliance policy tools. This latter finding is rein-
forced by the evidence reported here that state and federal evasion arc comple-
mentary activities. Th1~ suggests that further information shanng and return 
matching would be a fruitful activity. On the other hand, the conflicting 
results regarding the role of the tax practitioner are likely to be of value more 
for the debate they spark than for the results themselves. 
Another interesting implication of our research is what it implies about 
lhe design and implementation of amnesty programs. We have demonstrated 
that amnesty data can be useful for analyzing income tax evasion. despite 
some of the inherent limitation~ of these data. This would suggest that tax 
authorities in any JUrisdiction who may be contemplating a tax amnesty 
should give serious consideration to this type of analysis when designing the 
structure and administration of the program. In hindsight, it is unfortunate that 
more states did not plan for follow-up analysis amJ. a~ a result, much poten-
tially useful data have been destroyed or are not available in a usable form. 
This research can be extended and improved in 11 variety of ways. At the 
state level, a good place to start is the participation function. Ideally, th.is 
dec1sion would be formally modeled in order to identify the relevant explana-
tory factors more accurately. At the very least. it would be desimble to obtain 
better measures of the postamnesty penalty and probability variables that arc 
used for our ad hoc participation function. Along the same lines, better 
treatment of compliance policy instruments in the evasion function itself is 
needed. 
Improvements can also be made tn the analysis of evasion at the feder<tl 
level. Ideally. data from federal returns should be used to get a more complete 
measure or the extent of federal cvallion. Furthermore. this estimatiOn should 
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be done m a way that aJiows for both the truncauon and ~elf-selection bial'l 
problem-.. 
Despite this ample room for improvement. we believe that we have 
produced some interesting rc~ults. Equally imponant. in our opinion. is that 
we have demonstrated how amnesty data can be used to gain insights into the 
issue of 1ncome tax compliance. We believe this represents a new and poten-
tially fruitful direction for tax compliance analysis that should be given se-
rious attention. 
APPEND I X 
TABLE A1. Ordinary Least Squares Estimates 
of Michigan Individual Income Taxes Evaded (MICHEVA) 
Vanable Coettic•em T-Rallo p-Valuc 
FED EVA 0.335475 5.012 0.00000 
AGI 0 4:!7782 7 .310 0.00000 
PCTWHD - 0.133573 - 2.324 0.02112 
MALE -0.33899.2 - I 720 0 .08696 
MARRIED 0.104177 - 0 727 0.46830 
PREPARE -o 538374 - 3.791 0 .00020 
MTCLEMENS 0.107951 - 0 721 0.-17190 
FLINT - o 38403t - 1.388 I) 16679 
SAGINAW - 0.006079 01122 0 98248 
LANSING - 0 207721 0.1184 0.37779 
KALAMAZOO 0.20256t! -0 630 0.52911 
GRANDRAPI 0.260335 1 .mJ 019900 
TRAVERSe 0. 173662 0 646 (),51918 
UP 0.220065 - 0 .830 0.40779 
Con~lant 0 55740(\ 2o96 0.00763 
AdJu~tcd R 0.19446 
SER 0 77!1 13 
f'( 14.19R) 10.86420 
Log til..chhood -141 02300 
Nm~: See 1uhle :! for vnrJuble udtrullon~. 
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